Half Lockstep?

I've said it before, but it appears to be a source of chronic pain, so I will re-state my firm belief that, like pregnancy, you cannot be "half" lockstep and half not.  The logical universe of choices is:

• Pure Lockstep:  Fabulous if you can pull it off, but it's the increasingly rare firm with the history, the culture, and the relative freedom from exogenous shocks (e.g., lateral defections) that can stay so true.
• Eat What You Kill:  Generally dismal places to work, but unquestionably an example of capitalism at its most raw.  In my experience, such firms can be unstable for the long run, and major dislocations like the retirement of a big rainmaker can bring down the house.
• Modified Lockstep:  Not an oxymoron, but rather the practice of starting out with the presumption that compensation is lockstep, then modifying it in individual cases to reward/punish over/underachievers.  Permits the greatest flexiblity, as well as the chance to provide incentives for non-billable, firm-building efforts (serious pro bono efforts, associate development, bar leadership, etc.)

Clifford Chance has famously not achieved equilibrium on this issue, and the ongoing failure to bite the bullet continues to threaten their foray into the U.S. in general and New York in particular.  The most recent famous defector, Jim Benedict (to Milbank), summed it up with pith:

"I looked at the vote last fall [veto'ing "superpoints" for some New York partners] as saying that the purity of lockstep was more important than success in the U.S."

As any veteran of corporate-land mergers could have predicted, merging compensation systems at the most senior level simply cannot be avoided, elided, postponed, or finessed. And as any veteran of launching forays into New York could have predicted, superstars will demand their rewards.