Adam Smith, Esq.: The Bay of Pigs vs. The Cuban Missile Crisis: Lessons Learned?: Print This

How do you make decisions? By that I mean, when facing a material strategic (a/k/a "big") decision, who do you involve and what is the process you use to decide? (Don't pretend to blanche at the word "process"—lawyers are all about process, as you darned well know.)

Courtesy of Michael Roberto (Professor, Harvard Business School)'s Why Great Leaders Don't Take Yes for an Answer (Wharton School Publishing: 2005) [at p. 32], I present this quite remarkably enlightening table comparing the methodology behind JFK's disastrous Bay of Pigs decision with his universally-recognized-as-brilliant Cuba Missile Crisis decision. Evidently, JFK learned something between 1961 and 1963: You could too.

Bay of Pigs vs. Cuban Missile Crisis: Decision-Making Matrix
Process Characteristics	Bay of Pigs	Cuban Missile Crisis
Role of President Kennedy	Present at all critical meetings	Deliberately absent from initial meetings
Role of participants	Spokesman/advocates for particular departments and agencies	Skeptical generalists examining the "policy problem as a whole"
Group norms	Deference to experts; adherence to rules of protocol	Minimization of status/rank differences; freedom from rules of protocol
Participation and involvement	Extreme secrecy—very small group kept "in the know." Exclusion of lower-level aides and outsiders with fresh points of view.	Direct communication between JFK and lower-level officials with relevant knowledge and expertise. Periodic involvement of outside experts and fresh voices.
Use of subgroups	One small subgroup, driving the process. "The same men, in short, both planned the operation and judged its chances of success."	Two subgroups of equal size, power, and expertise. Repeated exchange of position papers and vigorous critique and debate.
Consideration of alternatives	Rapid convergence upon a single alternative. No competing plans presented to JFK.	Balanced consideration of two alternatives. Arguments for both options presented to JFK.
Institutionalization of dissent	No individual designated to occupy the special role of devil's advocate.	Two confidants of the present playing the role of "intellectual watchdog"—probing for the flaws in every argument.

This is not to criticize or to laud JFK—as I will remind you for the 179th time, this blog is apolitical. It is, rather, to contrast two nearly diametrically opposed decision-making processes, one with an outcome deeply embarrassing to the nation and costly in lives, the other potentially saving our planet from nuclear ruin, and to gently suggest you think about which model your actual decision-making process resembles.

No people have been killed in preparing this post.